



**HISTORY**  
**ROUTE 2**  
**HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL**  
**PAPER 1 – PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING – INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1918–36**

Friday 12 November 2010 (afternoon)

1 hour

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**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.

*Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.*

*Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.*

*These sources and questions relate to the retreat from the Anglo–American Guarantee.*

**SOURCE A**            *Extract from the Fontainebleau memorandum of 25 March 1919, written by David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister. Taken from **Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement**, Ray Stannard Baker, New York, 1922.*

Finally, I believe that until the authority and effectiveness of the League of Nations has been demonstrated, the British Empire and the United States ought to give France a guarantee against the possibility of a new German aggression. France has special reason for asking for such a decree. She has twice been attacked and twice invaded by Germany in half a century. She has been attacked because she has been the principal guardian of liberal and democratic civilization against Central European autocracy on the continent of Europe. It is right that the other great Western democracies should enter into an undertaking which will ensure that they stand by her side in time to protect her against invasion, should Germany ever threaten her again or until the League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve the peace and liberty of the world.

**SOURCE C**

*An extract from a series of talks between Édouard Herriot (French Prime Minister) and Ramsey Macdonald (British Prime Minister) 21–22 June 1924. Taken from **The Lost Peace**, Anthony Adamthwaite, London, 1980.*

Monsieur Herriot:

I understand the situation in which Mr MacDonald finds himself, but since we are speaking as good friends, I must explain to him the situation of France ... My country has a dagger pointed at its breast, within an inch of its heart. Common efforts, sacrifices, deaths in the war, all that will have been useless if Germany can once more have recourse to [opportunity for] violence. France cannot count only on an international conference, and the United States are a long way off ... I speak to you here from the bottom of my heart, and I assure you that I cannot give up the security of France, who could not face a new war.

Mr MacDonald:

I shall do all in my power to avoid a new war, for I am certain that in that case it would not be only France but all European civilization that would be crushed ... I do not wish to take an easy way to join in an offer to France of a military guarantee of security. I should only be deceiving you.

**SOURCE D**

*An extract from **Europe in the Twentieth Century**, Robert Paxton, New York, 1975. Paxton is a Professor of History at Columbia University.*

On the western front, the United States and Britain had left France the sole guarantor of its own security. The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles also meant the lapse of the simultaneous treaties that provided for automatic United States and British aid in case of German attack. French leaders felt betrayed, for they had moderated [reduced] their demands on Germany at the Peace Conference in return for this promise of future outside support. Although the French government tried to negotiate a substitute treaty of mutual defence with Britain alone during 1921 and 1922, the negotiators were unable to agree on how automatic British support of the French along the Rhine should be, for British public opinion was increasingly fearful of being drawn into another war by French aggression. As for European frontiers further east, no British government would make any commitments at all until 1939.

**SOURCE E**

*An extract from **The League of Nations**, F S Northedge, UK, 1986. Professor Northedge was a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.*

France had forgone one vital element in her security system at the Peace Conference in 1919, namely the separation of the west bank of the Rhine from Germany, in exchange for guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany offered by the British and American leaders, Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson. But this had fallen into disuse with the non-ratification of the treaties by the United States, and, with the resulting failure of that country to join the League, France considered the Covenant too weak to defend her against German aggression. When negotiations for an Anglo–French defence pact failed at the Cannes Conference in January 1922, French opposition to any disarmament scheme without a foolproof security system was confirmed.

1. (a) What does Source A suggest about Lloyd George’s attitude towards French security? *[3 marks]*
  
  2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and D about French security. *[6 marks]*
  
  3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source E for historians studying the Anglo–American Guarantee. *[6 marks]*
  
  4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the consequences of the failure of the Anglo–American Guarantee on international relations between 1920 and 1926. *[8 marks]*
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